Entropy-based anomaly detection has recently been extensively studied in order to overcome weaknesses of traditional volume and rule based approaches to network flows analysis. From many entropy measures only Shannon, Titchener and parameterized Renyi and Tsallis entropies have been applied to network anomaly detection. In the paper, our method based on parameterized entropy and supervised learning is presented. With this method we are able to detect a broad spectrum of anomalies with low false positive rate. In addition, we provide information revealing the anomaly type. The experimental results suggest that our method performs better than Shannon-based and volume-based approach. 466 P. Bereziński et al.
Introduction
The number of anomalies in IP networks caused by wormlike activities is growing [2] . Widely used security solutions based on signatures or rules like firewalls, antiviruses and intrusion detection systems do not provide sufficient protection because they do not cope with evasion techniques and not known yet (0-day) attacks [12] , [13] . Therefore, network anomaly detection as one of possible solutions is becoming an essential area of research. Anomaly detection is an identification of observations which do not conform to an expected behavior. In a supervised anomaly detection a labeled data set that involves training a classifier is required.
There are many problems with anomaly detectors which have to be addressed. The main challenge is setting up a precise boundary between normal and anomalous behavior to avoid high false positive error rate or low detection rate. Another problems are long computation time, anomaly details extraction and root-cause identification [7] . In our previous work [4] , some generalizations of entropy were described in details and preliminary results of using parameterized entropies were presented. In this paper, we make two major contributions. Firstly, we present our method and results in comparison with Shannon-based and volume-based approach. Secondly, we describe data set as well as the method we used to generate anomalies.
Entropy
In this section, we present some not commonly known theory regarding entropies used in our experiments. Definition of entropy as a measure of disorder comes from thermodynamic and was proposed in the early 1850s by Clausius. In 1948 Shannon adopted entropy to information theory. In information theory, entropy is a measure of the uncertainty associated with a random variable. The more random the variable, the bigger the entropy and in contrast, the greater certainty of the variable, the smaller the entropy. For a probability distribution p(X = x i ) of a discrete random variable X, the Shannon entropy is defined as:
X is the feature that can take values {x 1 , . . . , x n } and p(x i ) is the probability mass function of outcome x i . Depending on the base of the logarithm, different units can be used: bits (a = 2), nats (a = e) or hurtleys (a = 10). For the purpose of anomaly detection, sampled probabilities estimated from a number of occurrences of x i in a time window t are typically used. The value of entropy depends on randomness (it attains maximum when probability p(x i ) for every x i is equal) but also on the value of n. In order to measure randomness only, normalized forms have to be employed. For example, an entropy value can be divided by n or by maximum entropy defined as log a (n). If not only the degree of uncertainty is important but also the extent of changes between assumed and observed distributions, denoted as q and p respectively, a relative entropy, also known as the Kullback-Leibler divergence can be used:
To measure how much uncertainty is eliminated in X by observing Y the conditional entropy may be employed:
The Shannon entropy assumes a tradeoff between contributions from the main mass of the distribution and the tail. To control this tradeoff, two parameterized Shannon entropy generalizations were proposed, by Renyi (1970s) and Tsallis (late 1980s) respectively [18] , [22] . If the parameter denoted as α has a positive value, it exposes the main mass (the concentration of events that occur often), if the value is negative -it refers to the tail (the dispersion caused by seldom events). Both parameterized entropies (Renyi and Tsallis) derive from the Kolmogorov-Nagumo generalization of an average:
where φ is a function which satisfies the postulate of additivity (only affine or exponential functions satisfy this) and φ −1 is the inverse function. Renyi proposed the following function φ:
After transformations, Renyi entropy may be given in the following form:
Tsallis extended the Renyi entropy with the following function φ:
After transformations, the Tsallis entropy will be given by:
Both parameterized (Renyi and Tsallis) entropies:
expose concentration for α > 1 and dispersion for α < 1, converge to the Shannon entropy for α → 1, correspond to cardinality of X for α = 0.
Flow Monitoring
There are two approaches to network traffic monitoring, namely, packet-based and flowbased. In our work we focus on flow-based network monitoring since it is more scalable in the context of network speed. This approach is based on the ability of network devices to aggregate packets in flows. Each flow is cached by device and when it is finished or a timeout is exceed it is exported to an element called collector. Modern approach assumes the use of dedicated probes transparently connected as a passive appliance via span ports or network taps rather than the usage of routers to export flows. This approach (presented in Fig. 1 ) can overcome some performance limitations of routers. The concept of network flows was introduced by Cisco and is currently standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). According to the IETF IPFIX working group [1] , "A flow is defined as a set of IP packets passing an observation point in the network during a certain time interval. All packets belonging to a particular flow have a set of common properties". In the simplest form, these properties are source and destination addresses and ports. A flow is typically defined as a unidirectional sequence of packets, which means that there are two flows for each connection between two endpoints -one from the server to client and one from the client to server. Recently, bidirectional flows (one record for each session between two endpoints) are also supported by vendors.
Data Set
For the purpose of this work, we created the data set containing labeled flows. Firstly, we captured two-day (Tuesday, Wednesday) legitimate traffic from a medium size We can see time t on x axis (5 minute fixed time window) and the number of flows on y (log scale) axis. Working day starts around 7 am. and finishes around 4 pm. The volume of traffic (expressed in number of flows) for both days is similar, but looking at the number of packets ( Fig. 3) , this similarity is a bit lower.
Fig. 3. Legitimate traffic profile by number of packets
In the next step, we generated brute force, port scan, network scan and ddos anomalies in different variants. More details concerning anomaly generation process is presented in the next section. Main characteristics of generated anomalies are presented in Table 1 .
In the last step we mixed generated anomalies with the legitimate traffic from day2 (Wednesday) in the way presented in Fig. 4 . We did not inject anomalies into the traffic from day1 (Tuesday) as it is used to build the profile of legitimate traffic in our approach.
As one can see, each anomaly is injected every 15 minutes mainly during working time. After injection only a few anomalies are visible in the volume expressed by number of flows or number of packets as depicted respectively in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 . In order to produce flows that can mimic an anomalous behavior dedicated tool in Python language was developed. With this tool we can generate flows according to the predefined policy. The policy assigns a certain type of generation method to each field of flow record. In result we obtain a set of flows which meets given statistical profile. Internally, our tool operates on integer values which are manipulated by generation methods (introduced in [5] ). They are as follows: con (constant), ran (random) and per (periodical). Con generator is straightforward and does not need further explanation, others are described below. Ran generators are used to obtain random values. There are two types of such generators: absolute (e.g. srcPort in Listing 1.1) or relative (e.g. dstIP in Listing 1.1). The value produced with the relative generator is summed with previously generated one. This feature can be used to sweep across certain range of values. Both generators can be initiated with either uniform or arbitrary distribution. Arbitrary distribution consists of two list: values and probabilities of these values. Relative generator additionally needs a start value and a range. Per generators are used to match a certain generating method with the sequence number of the currently generated flow. They are initiated with a list of key-value pairs out of which the first one represents the flow number and the second -the generator definition. On the last position, the default generator is placed. For example, iar definition in Listing 1.1 means that every 300th flow a uniform(10,50) generator will be applied and respectively every 800th flow generator returns 5000. In other cases, default generator will be applied. The set of generators shown on Listing 1.1 is called the generator group. A policy may consist of multiple groups. In such a case probability of using a certain generator group must be defined. Only one generator group (considered as default) in a policy has a generator for each field of the flow. The additional groups may override all or selected definitions of the default one. A concept of a generator group was introduced to ensure that fields of the flow will be consistent with each other. For example, to disallow flows which are too short when compared with the amount of bytes of the flow. There are phenomena on the network that can only be modeled with sequences of flows. Our tool provides such a functionality which is available through indexing of group names. In such indexed groups, one can use mechanisms which allow sharing state between subsequent flows. For example, in Listing 1.2, we enforced value of dstIP not to be changed through the whole sequence. An example of a similar generator is Flame [5] . However, there are some significant differences. Flame comes with very basic support for generating flows, forcing users to implement all the generation logic by themselves, while our tool supports policy files. On the other hand it has fairly sophisticated functionality of inserting generated flows into the base traffic which our tool does not support at all. Another interesting concept was introduced in [19] . Authors proposed to describe network traffic (not only flows) by a set of so-called αand β-profiles which can subsequently be used to generate a data set. α-profiles consist of actions which should be executed to generate a given event in the network (such as attack) while β-profiles are more similar to our policy files where behavior of certain entities (packet sizes, number of packets per flow) are represented by statistical model. On the whole this concept is similar to ours but far more complex.
Network Anomaly Detector
In this section we present entropy-based network anomaly detection module which is a component of the anomaly detection and security event data correlation system currently developed it the Secor project [8] . The goal of this module is to detect network anomalies with acceptable false positive error rate and high detection rate, classify anomalies and report some details (timestamps, related addresses and ports) to the correlation engine (output) which correlates events coming from different modules and external sensors in order to improve detection and limit false positive rate. The architecture of our network anomaly detection module is presented in Fig. 7 . Fig. 7 . Entropy-based network anomaly detection module IP traffic is captured by NetFlow [1] probes. We decided to use bidirectional flows since, according to some works (e.g. [17] ), unidirectional flows may entail biased results. In order to limit the area of search, filters per direction, protocol and subnet are used. Collected flows are analyzed within constant-length time intervals (every 5 min. by default). Next, depends on the version, Tsallis or Renyi entropy of positive and negative α values are calculated for traffic feature distributions presented in Table 2 . Note: the Shannon version of our method use internally Renyi entropy with α set to 1.
Initially, during the training phase, a dynamic profile is built using min and max entropy values within a sliding time window for every feature, α pair. Thus, we can reflect traffic changes during the day. In the detection phase, the observed entropy is in(out)-degree number of hosts with x i as in (out)−degree total number of hosts compared with the min and max values stored in the profile according to the following rule:
With this rule, anomaly threshold is defined. Values r α (x i ) < 0 or r α (x i ) > 1 indicate abnormal concentration or dispersion respectively. This abnormal dispersion or concentration for different feature distributions is characteristic for anomalies. For example, during a port scan, a high dispersion in port numbers and high concentration in addresses should be observed. Detection is based on the relative value of entropy with respect to the distance between min and max. Coefficient k in the formula determines a margin for min and max boundaries and may be used for tuning purposes. A high value of k, e.g. k = 2, limits the number of false positives while a low value (k = 1) increases detection rate. We also take into consideration other approaches to thresholding based on standard deviation and quantiles. The detection is based on the results from all feature distributions. Classification is based on classifiers (decision trees, Bayes nets [20] , rules and functions) employed in Weka software [3] . Extraction of anomaly details is also assumed -related ports and addresses are obtained by looking into the top contributors to the entropy value.
Results
Experiments were performed for Tsallis, Renyi and Shannon version of our method as well as traditional volume-based approach with flow, packet and byte counters. Final evaluation was performed with Weka tool. Some examplary results of entropies for a selected singular feature distributions are presented below. Abnormally high dispersion in destination addresses distribution for network scan anomalies exposed by negative value of α parameters is depicted in Fig. 8 Abnormal concentration of flows duration for network scans is depicted in Fig. 9 . This concentration is typical for anomalies with fixed data stream. Fig. 10 shows ambiguous detection (no significant excess of 0 − 1 threshold) of port scan anomaly with volume-based approach with flow, packet and byte counters. R on y axis corresponds to normalization applied in our method [equation (9)].
We noticed that measurements for all feature distributions as a group work better than single ones or subsets. The best results were obtained for addresses, ports and duration feature distributions, although we believe that the proper set of feature distributions is specific for particular anomalies.
Overall (whole data set, all feature distributions) multi-class classification was performed with Weka tool. We defined 4 classes for each anomaly type + 1 class for legitimate traffic. To properly asses predictive performance ten-fold cross-validation method was used. An ideal classifier should not produce false positive and false negative statistical errors. To evaluate non-ideal classifiers, one could measure proportion of correct Fig. 10 . Ambiguous detection of port scan anomaly with a volume-based approach assessments to all assessments (Accuracy), the share of benign activities reported as anomalous (False Positive Rate) and the share of anomalies missed by the detector (False Negative Rate). Usage of Precision (proportion of correctly reported anomalies) and Recall (share of correctly reported anomalies compared to the total number of anomalies) is another option. Based on these measures some tools like ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) and PR (Precision vs Recall) are typically used [9] . Averaged performance of classification for different classifiers is presented in Table 3 .
ZeroR is a trivial classifier which classifies the whole traffic as normal. We included it here as a reference to other results. We believe that an accuracy is not the correct choice to measure the performance of classification if data set is unbalanced -more normal than anomalous in our case. We suggest to look at ROC area and PR area instead. From the whole spectrum of tested methods the best performance was obtained by applying Logistic Regression, Bayesian Network, Decision Tree and Random Forest classifiers.
Conclusions and Future Work
Concluding the results of our studies, we can observe that, for our dataset: i) the Tsallis entropy performed best; ii) the Renyi entropy was slightly weaker; iii) the Shannon entropy was a bit worse than the Renyi (except from the Random Forest classifier); iv) the volume-based method performed poorly; v) among a large set of network traffic feature distributions, addresses, ports, and flows durations proved to be the best choices; vi) the most successful classifiers were Linear Regression, Bayes Network, Decision Tree and Random Forest. In general we believe that a broad spectrum of feature distributions provides a better flexibility to detect different types of anomalies. While we admit that our experiments were limited to few number of cases, we also believe that these cases were representative. Our data set contains traces of network malicious activities which are typical for worm propagation, communication and attacks performed by group of machines infected by worms. Although, only one day legitimate traffic profile was built in our experiments, we have observed that this profile suits to each regular working day in the network we monitored. While more research work is necessary to validate the efficiency of the parameterized entropies, the poor performance of the Shannon entropy and volume-based methods allows to question whether they are the right approach to anomaly detection. In our method the precise traffic profile is the key, so future work will include optimization and experiments with more fluctuative legitimate traffic. We are also planning to model new anomalies and inject them into our data set to perform evaluation on a larger scale. We hope to retain good performance.Ś
